Documents produced during my studies
- Presence predicts false memories of VE content
Authored by: Labuschagne, B., Nunez, D. and Blake, E.
False memories can be created by a simple priming manipulation (the Deese-Roediger-McDermott procedure). This phenomenon operates via the
associative character of declaritive memory. if it is true that content knowledge plays an important role in presence (as some have
argued), then a presence experience coule prime a subject and create false memories. We tested this notion by repeatedly exposing 47
subjects to a themed VE, and after a 72 hour delay, testing their recall of VE content. As predicted, subjects tended to have higher
false memory rates (of VE content) than chance level for moderately specific memory items, and lower than chance level rates of false
memory for highly specific items. Furthermore, engagement aand naturalness (as measured with the ITC-SOPI) predicted false memory rates.
These finidings support the notion that subjects' semantiv knowledge plays a role in the presence experience.
- Longitudinal effects on presence: Suspension of disbelief or distrust of naive belief?
Authored by: Blake, E., Nunez, D. and Labuschagne, B.
We propose two models of how a subject's growing experience in a medium affects presence: The Spin model (based on Spinoza) which predicts
subjects begin as present and then learn to become non-present; and the SoD model (based on Coleridge) which predicts that subjects
expend effort to suspend their disbelief during presence. In a longitudinal study, 47 subjects (divided randomly into an
attention-focussing and attention-neutral group) were exposed to the same VE over three days, and measured with the ITC-SOPI after the
first and final exposures, and then again after a 72 hour delay. The data show the attentionneutral subjects experienced a slight
increase in spatial presence, while the attention-focussed subjects showed no change over time. After the delay, the attention-focussing
group experiences an increase in spatial presence and the attention-neutral group remains unchanged. We argue that this is, within the
limits of the study, evidence for the Spin model. We conclude by discussing the theoretical and measurement implications of the models